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1.  Introduction 
 
The development strategy of the Uruguayan economy has evolved from inward-looking, based 
on state interventionism and import substitution protectionist policies, to outward-looking, based 
on the market as a resource allocation mechanism and exports as the growth engine. This change 
started in the 1970s, when a first phase of trade liberalization took place accompanied by a quick 
financial liberalization process. During the 1990s, a second phase of trade liberalization took 
place. This phase combined a deepened gradual unilateral tariff reduction with the creation of 
Mercosur, an imperfect customs union signed with Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay.  In addition, 
a stabilization program based on an exchange rate anchor was undertaken. This policy 
considerably reduced inflation—which had climbed to three digits figures at the beginning of the 
decade—to an actual annual rate of around 13 percent, but it was simultaneously accompanied 
by a significant real appreciation of the peso, especially vis-à-vis the currencies of non-Mercosur 
countries. 
Uruguay is a small economy whose industrial structure was in the mid-1980s basically 
composed of a small number of traditional-products exporting firms and of sectors developed 
under the import-substitution process. Most industries showed very high concentration levels, 
giving firms considerable market power and thus allowing them to set prices substantially above 
marginal costs. This kind of productive structure, highly concentrated and dependent on 
protection, had as a byproduct a high degree of formalization in industry employment and also 
placed unions in an advantageous position in wage negotiations. 
Although Uruguay started to open its economy in the 1970s, only in the 1990s was local 
industry affected by the lowering of tariffs to no more than 30 percent.  In June 1991 Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay started a process of programmed trade reductions that in 1995 
allowed a wide range of products to be freely traded among Mercosur countries. 
In 2002, Uruguay suffered a profound financial crisis triggered by contagion effects from 
a depositor run on banks, massive currency devaluation, and gigantic default on sovereign debt 
that took place in next-door Argentina. In the wake of a run on its own exceedingly dollarized 
banking system, Uruguay’s government was forced by the ensuing loss of international reserves 
to let the currency depreciate rapidly. Subsequently, it had to provide support to some financial 
institutions while taking over several failing private-sector banks, for which purpose massive 
financial backing from the Washington-based multilateral agencies was obtained. Eventually, the 
  2government also had to arrange for a market-friendly restructuring of the public debt. Starting in 
the fourth quarter of 2003, however, the Uruguayan economy staged a vigorous recovery and the 
government regained access to the domestic and international capital markets. 
    Overall, the economic performance of Uruguay in the last half-century has been 
disappointing. Per capita GDP grew at relatively modest rates
1 (1.10 percent annually), well 
below the growth rate of more dynamic countries in Latin America (e.g., Brazil with 2.4 percent 
average growth for the same period), and East Asia (e.g., Korea or Thailand, with annual growth 
rates above 4 percent).  
The October 2004 presidential election marked an inflection point in Uruguayan history. 
A coalition of leftist parties that had acted as the main opposition party over the two decades 
since the restoration of democracy won the presidential election and assured itself a majority in 
the legislative branch of government. One of the main ideas stressed during the campaign was 
“Uruguay Productivo” vis-à- vis “Uruguay Financiero” and it was presented as a change in the 
development vision of the country. Although many productive policies in Uruguay were already 
in place, after the election the political momentum of recent years favored the discussion of the 
efficiency of such policies and the development of new ones.  
In this paper, after a brief review of the Productive Development Policies (PDP) system, 
we focus on three horizontal and three vertical policies and analyze the principal characteristics 
of these PDPs in terms of the market and coordination failures that each tries to address. 
Horizontal policies include the Investment Promotion Bill of 1998 and its 2007 modifications, 
the current state of the Innovation Policy, including the many changes put in place by the 
Vázquez Administration, and the Directives for Industrial Development announced by the 
Government in May of 2009. We also describe and analyze process by which those productive 
development policies (PDPs) are established, that is, the institutional structure that includes 
public and private actors and their interactions. Vertical policies include the modifications to the 
Forestry Law implemented by the current administration, policies attempting to assure meat 
quality and differentiation from other countries’ exports, and a project of sustainable 
(responsible) production in the soy industry. 
                                                           
1 Average rate for the 1950-2000 period. 
  32.  Overview of the Uruguayan PDP System 
 
The 1980s were generally characterized by the abandonment of explicit industrial policies in 
Latin America. This period meant the adoption of structural reforms away from import 
substitution strategies and an active development role for the state towards a process of 
allocation of resources by means of free and unregulated markets (IDB, 2001). By the mid- 
1990s, economic and social conditions had shown that the radical shifts of the 1980s had not 
achieved the desired outcomes of sustainable and equitable growth. 
The 1990s witnessed the adoption of a new set of policies throughout Latin America. 
Most countries adopted medium and long-term explicit industrial policies and strategies 
generally based on the belief that economic growth and development did not involve choosing 
between the state and the market. Instead, a cooperative process involving both was needed 
(Melo, 2001).  
The key features of the new industrial policies can be characterized by two elements: i) 
macroeconomic stability consistent with sustainable investment and long-term growth, and ii) 
microeconomic incentives aimed at the correction of market and public failures to improve 
productivity and the international competitiveness of domestic production. The latter represented 
a shift in the international strategy of the countries of the region from inward-oriented policies 
towards export development and diversification.  
Macroeconomic conditions in Uruguay have traditionally depended on economic and 
social conditions in Argentina and Brazil. Until recent years, financial and trade integration with 
those countries have had significant effects on Uruguayan international competitiveness and 
financial conditions mainly through the impact on the capital account (capital flows) and the 
level of real exchange rates.
2    
The recent history of Uruguayan industrial policies also needs to be considered within 
Mercosur. It was tacitly agreed that the Uruguayan role within Mercosur was heavily restricted 
to development in land-intensive agriculture, financial services and tourism (mainly from 
Argentina).
3 As preliminary evidence of this, in 1999 foreign direct investment (FDI) as a 
                                                           
2 The Brazilian devaluation of 1999 and the 2002 political and economic crisis in Argentina are the most recent 
episodes that affected macro and microeconomic conditions in Uruguay. 
3 Causal evidence of this is the recent conflict with Argentina due to foreign direct investment in a pulp and paper 
factory in Uruguay. 
  4proportion of GPD in Uruguay was 0.7 percent, compared to almost 3 percent in Argentina and 
Brazil. Table 1 summarizes the country’s industrial policies. 
 
Table 1. Horizontal and Vertical Industrial Policies in Uruguay 
 
 Horizontal  Vertical 
Public Input  Macroeconomic Instability 
Volatility of Real Exchange Rate 
Educated Labor Force 
Acceptable Business Climate 
Poor National Innovation System 
Very limited due to public 
financial restrictions 
Market oriented  Export credit lines 
Working Capital credit lines 
Export Insurance 
Tax rebates to export industries 
Exemption of import duties for inputs to 
export products 
Temporal Admission Scheme 
Export Free Zones 
Credit lines for Investment projects 
Tax incentives to Oil, graphics, 
logistics, forestry, military, 
airlines, theatres, and film 
industries. 
       Source: IDB (2001). 
 
More recently, Hausmann, Rodríguez-Clare and Rodrik (2005) analyze the scope for new 
growth opportunities in Uruguay in the context of “self-discovery,” that is, the development of 
new products and processes tailored to export growth.
4 That work, a significant improvement 
over the IDB study of 2001, constitutes the basis for our present project. 
Briefly, Hausmann, Rodríguez-Clare and Rodrik (2005) find an adequate institutional 
environment for productive development. However, they note that the country’s Industrial 
Promotion Legislation remains neutral in regard to new investment opportunities and creates 
incentives for activities with few demonstration effects (i.e., non-tradables), which in their 
opinion, constitutes a major drawback for self-discovery and growth. Export Promotion Zones do 
not provide adequate linkages to the rest of the economy, possibly due to coordination failures in 
industries such as Information and Telecommunications. They also note that exchange rate 
policy has not contributed to the long-term development of the country, in part due to domestic 
policies but also due to macroeconomic volatility in Argentina and Brazil. The National 
Innovation System does not provide adequate horizontal support due to internal inconsistencies 
among the different components and because of financial constraints. Finally, vertical policies 
(“picking winners”) seem to be the product of historical circumstances and chance.  
                                                           
4 “New products,” meaning the development of products which are not produced in the country. 
  5The time when those authors performed their comprehensive analysis leaves us an “easy 
picking” (to paraphrase Paul Samuelson’s words in his now popular development of the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem): their paper refers to a situation right before a new government was elected 
in October 2004. The government that took office in 2005 has implemented a series of 
institutional innovations that modify the scale and scope of support for the productive 
development of Uruguay. 
There have been significant recent modifications to the institutional setting (i.e., actors 
and activities) in support of productive development. The new actors, created by the government, 
are the following:  
 
a)  The Department of Support to the Private Sector under the Secretary of 
Finance, 
b)  The National Agency for Research and Innovation, intended to improve 
support for innovation and self-discovery.  
 
The new activities are as follows:  
 
a)   With IDB support, The Office of Planning and Budget (OPP) has set up a 
program of productive cluster development (PACC, or Progama de Apoyo 
a la Competitividad de Clusters y Cadenas Productivas). 
b)   A “one-stop-shop” (“Uruguay fomenta”) for local and foreign investors 
was created in July 2008.  
c)   Congress has also approved a bill that allows for the creation of Export 
Consorcios to overcome the scale and knowledge problem that many small 
Uruguayan companies face when trying to integrate into the international 
market. 
d)   The Bill of Industrial Promotion has been modified to include new tax 
incentives to be granted to qualified investment projects.  
e)  Other activities to boost industrial production have included the 
implementation of so-called “productive gas-oil” to reduce production 
costs of farmers and manufacturers.   
f)  Tax exemptions have been granted for tourists when consuming in restaurants and 
other tourist attractions during the high season. 
  6The Government also modified the general approach to social problems. For example, the 
Secretary of Economic and Social Development was established in 2005 to implement an 
Emergency Plan to help the poorest and the indigent. This Secretary has further developed a plan 
of inclusion of citizens in more productive activities. On the labor side, salary councils (where 
workers, firms and government officials discuss and agree upon labor conditions) were re-
established after 18 years.  
At the regulatory level, the Government has sent to Congress an Education Bill to reform 
the current educational system, while the National Health system was reformed in 2007. The tax 
code was also reformed in 2007, primarily through the implementation of a Personal Income Tax 
and the suppression and/or modification of existing direct and indirect taxes. The reform 
nonetheless has direct productive development implications. 
As for international integration and innovation activities, Uruguay has recently signed a 
trade and investment agreement with Chile and has consolidated the institutional framework of 
the Pasteur Institute. Trade and investment agreements with countries outside of Mercosur are 
considered useful as an instrument to attract foreign direct investment and foster a process of 
sutainable development. Likewise, the Pasteur Institute is recognized as a leading institution in 
areas such as biotechnology, which is considered one of the most prominent development areas.  
On the other hand, Uruguay could not achieve internal political agreement on starting free trade 
agreement negotiations with the United States.
5 
 
3.   Horizontal  Policies 
 
3.1.  Innovation 
 
3.1.1  Introduction 
 
The current administration has assigned the largest budget ever to education and innovation 
programs in Uruguay, with public education scheduled to reach 4.5 percent of GDP in 2009. 
Innovation in Uruguay remains low in comparison with developed countries, but in recent years 
there have been various institutional and policy changes aiming to increase research efforts and 
link them to productive activities.  
The first institutional change promoted by the Vázquez Administration was the 
conformation of the “Gabinete Ministerial de la Innovación” (GMI, Ministerial Innovation 
                                                           
5 Alternatively, both countries signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). 
  7Committee) by Decree 136 of February 2005. This committee is made up of delegates of the 
Ministers of Education, Economy, Industry and Energy, and Agriculture, respectively, and of  
the director of the Budget and Planing Office (Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto). The 
main objective of this committee is to coordinate the actions of all public institutions related to 
innovation, science and technology.
6 The decree also requests from the committee the 
formulation of a National Strategic Plan on Science, Innovation and Technology (PENCTI for its 
acronym in Spanish, Plan Estratégico Nacional de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación).  
In September 2007 the PENCTI was made public.
7 The first paragraph of the PENCTI 
presents a broad set of actors involved in the plan. In particular, it mentions that the process of 
continuous innovation necessary in the modern world can only be attained with the commitment 
of public authorities, entrepreneurs, workers, “third sector” organizations and Uruguayan 
scientists and Uruguayan innovative entrepreneurs living abroad. 
The definition of innovation is broad as well. According to the PENCTI, innovation is a 
social process implying the creation and use of new knowledge, products, process, goods, 
services, tools or forms of organization. The diagnostic of the current situation presented in the 
PENCTI can be summarized in three points. First, most of the existing ability to generate and 
develop new scientific and technological knowledge is concentrated in the public sector.
8 
Second, much of this new knowledge is disseminated only among the academic community and 
has no impact on productive activities. Third, firms in the private sector have low demand for 
innovations.   
The PENCTI does not discuss the determinants of the current situation, a silence that may 
result from political economy issues. The document does, however, point out that in the past the 
political system was able to alter innovation system model proposals and to generate its own 
designs. These ad hoc designs were primarily the product of successive negotiations and lacked a 
study of the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed models. The PENCTI seeks to improve on 
this situation and to present a model backed by the executive branch of government. 
                                                           
6 “…cuyo objetivo principal será la coordinación y articulación de las acciones gubernamentales vinculadas a las 
actividades de Innovación, Ciencia y Tecnología para el desarrollo del País” (Decree 136/05 Article 1). 
7 There are several important annexes that are not yet publicly available. Annex I is supposed to present basic 
indicators on science, technology and innovation in Uruguay. It is important as the benchmark to compare the 
evolution of the programs in this area. Annex II argues in detail why the market by itself does not efficiently allocate 
resources for innovation and therefore justifies the Government’s participation as an active player in the design and 
execution of science, technology and innovation policies.  
  8It is interesting that the plan discusses the enforcement of the priorities defined by the 
GMI. This enforcement is relevant only for public sector actors and, to a certain extent, the 
Universidad de la República. The actors of the private sectors (private universities, firms, etc.) 
will adhere to the PENCTI priorities voluntarily if they find the incentives proposed of interest. 
In other words, there will part of the Innovation policy that will be provided as a public input and 
other part that will work through market mechanisms. 
 
3.1.2  Commitment for Active Policies 
 
The PENCTI has made a commitment to active promotion policies but notes that this will be 
done without neglecting the market as a source of discipline in sorting out economic alternatives.  
Active policies are presented as necessary to solve market failures.  
Relevant market failures are the following: i) limited appropriability of generic 
technologies, ii) information failures between actors, and iii) risks associated with the 
intangibility of assets.  
Immediately after arguing the need for state intervention, the plan points to the risks 
involved in that intervention: i) dynamic inconsistency (difficulties in implementing policies 
with short-run costs and long-run benefits), ii) rent capture, and iii) principal-agent problems. 
The PENCTI considers a wide range of policies. First, the plan mentions that a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition is the creation of an appropriate environment for the development 
of innovations and its applications to new technologies. To do so, the government has created the 
National Research and Innovation Agency (ANII) in order to make the government’s 
commitment as credible as possible.  
Second, the plan mentions the use of horizontal policies to promote the generations of 
innovations.
9 These horizontal policies include i) greater investment in human capital formation, 
and ii) changes in legislation and regulations that may directly or indirectly hamper the 
development of innovations. For instance, the Tax Reform Bill (Bill 18.083) passed in December 
2006 establishes incentives for activities leading to innovation. Examples of these activities are 
favorable tax treatment of personnel education spending and tax exemptions for the acquisition 
of research equipment.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 Universidad de la República, Instituto Clemente Estable, Instituto Nacional de Investigación Agropecuaria (INIA), 
Laboratorio Tecnológica del Uruguay (LATU), Instituto Nacional de Carnes (INAC).  
  9Third, vertical policies are also deemed necessary. According to the document, vertical 
policies should seek the interaction of knowledge-intensive sectors with traditional natural 
resource-intensive sectors such as agriculture, tourism, and energy. Export potential is an 
objective in these interventions.  
In respect to the financial sources, the PENCTI mentions that innovative firms have often 
financed their activities through retained earnings due to the lack of external sources. Private 
finance sources of innovations are considered fundamental, and therefore it is important to 
promote the emergence of venture capitalists who could provide seed and “angel” money.  
  
3.1.3  PENCTI’s Objectives 
 
The Program’s Objectives and Goals can be summarized as follows:  
 
1.  To increase the interaction of researchers with the social environment and 
production activities; 
2.  To promote firms’ innovations; 
3.  To foster the development of science, technology and innovation human 
capital; 
4.  To promote innovation and quality in small and medium firms; 
5.  To foster innovations with social goals; 
6.  To use innovations for public sector governance; 
7.  To develop regional innovations not concentrated only in the capital city;  
8.  To advance scientific and technologic knowledge; 
9.  To facilitate investments in scientific and technologic infrastructure; 
10. To finance innovations; 
11. To promote interaction with international science and technology networks; 
and 
12. To develop mechanisms for impact evaluation. 
 
The plan also discusses the actions that should be taken in regard to each objective.  A 
detailed analysis of all those actions, however, lies beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
9 As the report notes, “…es relevante que existan políticas transversales para fortalecer el apoyo a los procesos 
innovadores en general independientemente del sector en el cual se pretenda aplicar el incentivo”. 
  103.1.4  Research Networks 
The team in charge of the PENCTI hired the School of Social Sciences of the Universidad de la 
República to study the state of research and innovation networks between research centers and 
firms. Although the resulting paper (Pittaluga et al., 2007) is not an official document,
10 it 
provides the rationale for the main policy motivation. 
In Pittaluga et al. (2007) there is a strong emphasis on the creation of networks as a 
solution to the limited appropriability of innovation market failure. Networks will transform the 
public good innovation into a club good in which all of the beneficiaries of the innovation are 
part of the club. If the network works properly the free riding problem is substantially reduced. 
The authors present a set of recommendations to foster the development of networks based on 25 
case studies of networks and research policies applied in Uruguay between 2002 and 2007.  
There are a series of requisites needed for the consolidation of networks. First, the 
programs should be long run and stable. They should have sufficient economic resources, be 
flexible to adapt goals according to partial results and be subject to evaluation.  Coordination 
between different policies is important in order to avoid superposition, which has happened in 
the past. Any set of policies to promote innovation networks should use both horizontal and 
vertical policies.  
After arguing that the market by itself produces suboptimal results, the authors warn of 
failures associated with state intervention. One of the findings from their case studies is that very 
often there is a wide range of programs, but with insufficient resources. They suggest that, trying 
to avoid selection biases, it is important for promoted programs to have the appropriate budget. 
In other words, it is important to determine whether a higher priority is given to the impact of 
programs or to covering a wide range of alternatives. A second failure refers to the human capital 
in charge of managing the programs. Many of these managers have strong backgrounds in the 
network-program area of expertise (e.g., agriculture, biotech, etc.) but are not as strong in 
modern management techniques, negotiations techniques and business plan follow-up. A third 
problem with state intervention regards the need to make public policies jointly coherent and to 
avoid superposition problems. Finally, as networks could transform innovations into club goods, 
partnerships among research centers, labs and firms have considerable potential. Care should 
nonetheless be taken not to make the formation of partnerships a goal in itself. Rather than being 
                                                           
10 But it is available from the ANII webpage.  
  11rewarded for partnerships per se, programs should be rewarded with respect to innovation 
performance.  
  
3.1.5  National Research and Innovation Agency 
 
The creation of the National Research and Innovation Agency (ANII, Agencia Nacional de 
Investigación e Innovación) is the most important institutional change in the area of research and 
innovation. Article 256 of the Budget Bill of December 2005 provided for the creation of an 
Innovation Agency to be in charge of the organization and management of policies to promote 
innovation, science and technology, and in doing so promote coordination among institutions and 
consider the social and production needs of the country. The bill gave the President 180 days to 
present to the Congress a proposal detailing the juridical nature of the Agency, the details of its 
goals and its internal organization.  
Established in December 2006 by Bill 18.084,  ANII was constituted as a non-
governmental state institution (“persona jurídica de derecho público no estatal”) which means 
that for anything that is not explicitly established in the Bill the Agency will act as a private 
institution (e.g., accountancy, exemptions of personnel from consideration as civil servants,   
procurement and selling). This may grant the ANII flexibility and speed in decision-making. 
In line with the PENCTI, the main objectives of the ANII are the following:  
 
1.  to generate and manage programs for the promotion and development of 
science, technology and innovation following the strategic and political 
guidelines of the executive branch of government; 
2.  to promote the coordination of actions between public and private actors; and 
3.  to facilitate (with other innovation institutions) the development of evaluation 
mechanisms. 
 
The board of directors of the ANII is made up of seven members. The Government 
selects five, and the other two are selected by the National Innovation, Science and Technology 
Council (CONICYT, Consejo Nacional de Innovación, Ciencia y Tecnología). The CONICYT 
was created by Law 17.296 of February 2001 with basically the same objectives as the ANII.
11 
Bill 18.084, which created the ANII, did not eliminate CONICYT but rather re-defined its goals. 
                                                           
11 Previously, other public sector agencies were in charge of science and innovation.  
  12The main change is that after 2006 CONICYT started to act more as a consultative body. At this 
point it should be noted that CONICYT consists of 21 members: 5 representing the executive 
branch of government, 1 representing other public enterprises, 4 representing the Universidad de 
la República, 2 representing private universities, 1 member selected by researchers active in the 
National System of Researchers (SNI, Sistema Nacional de Investigadores, a program of the 
ANII), 5 representing the productive sector and named by industry associations, 1 representing 
municipalities, 1 representing labor unions, and 1 representing  the institution in charge of 
primary and secondary education. CONICYT’s president is selected by this 21-member directory 
board. 
 
3.1.6  National Research and Innovation Agency and the Private Sector 
 
The ANII has four basic programs targeted to firms in the private sector. The first program, the 
Young Firms Program (Programa de Empresas Jóvenes), is directed to start-ups. The background 
of this project is Ingenio, a business incubator in the Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) field, created as a joint initiative by the Laboratorio Tecnológico del Uruguay 
(LATU) and Universidad ORT Uruguay with financial support from the Inter-American 
Development Bank. Ingenio builds on the joint effort of the Government, the universities and the 
private sector to foster the development of the information and communication technology 
industry as key to the economic growth of the country. An evaluation of the Ingenio program 
found that, although generally successful, it could be improved by giving entrepreneurs more 
time to complete their projects. The Young Firms Program provides a subsidy of US$20,000 for 
one year, providing a monthly salary of up to US$600 per entrepreneur, with a limit of two per 
project, to help them to focus on their project without the need to moonlighting. These projects 
are approved directly by the ANII committee without external technical evaluations. In the call 
for projects held in 2002, some 22 projects were presented and 10 were approved.  
The second program, which targets existing firms, subsidizes 40 to 60 percent of a 
project’s cost of the project. The percentage of the subsidy depends on the size of the investment 
(small, medium or large project) and the extent of the innovation proposed. This program 
operates in an “open window” system in which firms can present an outline of their request at 
any time. Within two weeks program directors evaluate the request and invite selected firms to 
present a full proposal. A technical expert and a financial expert evaluate the full proposal. 
  13About 60 outlines were presented in 2008, the year prior to this paper’s writing, with an approval 
rate of about 10 percent. Although the program is horizontal, according to Fernando Brun 
(director in charge of the firms programs of the ANII), there is a bias in favor of technological 
sectors. Brun noted that, although this program has been successful, there is the need to 
complement implementation of industry funds (e.g., energy, biotech) with more vertical 
measures.  
The goal of the third program is to improve the efficiency and to obtain quality 
certifications of small and medium firms. This program operates under an open window system 
and has very few requirements, providing a subsidy of up to 50 percent of the cost of the firm’s 
proposal, with a maximum subsidy of US$12,000). The directors are presently considering 
profound changes in this program, including additional application requirements (e.g., funding 
only of export-oriented projects) and a significant increase in the maximum subsidy.  
A question always surrounding subsidy-based policies is whether they really promote 
new production lines within established firms and facilitate the entrance of new players or 
merely transfer rents to firms that would have acted exactly in the same way in the absence of the 
subsidy. This question cannot be readily answered. One of ANII directors noted that in many 
instances they must make decisions on the basis of intuition. In most cases this intuition is that, 
although the subsidy goes to projects that would have been carried out anyway, the subsidy 
permits faster and better development of them.  
Finally, the fourth program promotes the formation of networks. This program has two 
steps. In the first step, a group of firms can request for ANII assistance in hiring someone to 
work with them to develop a proposal addressing a common problem. The ANII subsidizes 100 
percent of the coordinator’s salary for the first 6 months and, if needed, 50 percent of that salary 
for an additional 6 months. The second step involves the evaluation of the proposal, which could 
in theory be subsidized by the ANII. Up to now, however, no project has reached this second 
stage, and there are only three networks working on the first stage. According to Brun, the club 
good concept that inspires this program has a very strong theoretical basis but is very difficult to 
implement.  
 
  143.1.7  Summary  
 
In recent years there has been a greater emphasis than ever before on innovation policies in 
Uruguay. There has always emerged an acute awareness that public sector innovation processes 
must work hand-in-hand with production activities and the private sector. It is too early to 
determine the success of this effort, but the programs being implemented seem to be in line with 
the general objectives of the Government. 
 
3.2  Directives on Industrial Strategy 
 
3.2.1  Introduction 
 
The following data gathered in 2007 provide an overview of the Uruguayan industrial sector: 
 
•  Industrial production represents around 25 percent of GDP (some US$5.5 
billion in 2007). 
•  Total investment in equipment totaled US$750 million, less than 13 percent of 
GDP.  
•  Total foreign investment reached US$600 million. 
•  Industrial exports were at their historical maximum: US$2,139 million. 
•  Industrial exports were also were at their historical maximum: US$5,469 
million, of which US$3,661 were raw materials and US$782 million were 
investment goods. 
•  Although exports have boomed, future growth may be limited by the fact that 
primary, non-sophisticated products have been the mainstay of that impressive 
growth. 
 
Second, it is the opinion of the Secretary of Industry that Uruguay is located at the lowest 
stage of industrial development, as shown in Figure 1 below, which was taken from the May 
2008 document “Directivas de Desarrollo Industrial.” This first stage corresponds to the 
production and exports of agricultural products and less sophisticated manufactures: 












Source: Ministry of Industry. 
 
Stage 2 corresponds to the existence of poorly developed support industries that are 
poorly developed in technological terms. Firms in Stage 3 are capable of producing acceptable 
quality products and show knowledge of existing technologies. Finally, in Stage 4 firms can 
innovate and design high-quality products at the international level. 
In other words, Uruguay’s productive structure is not the most appropriate for achieving 
long-term, sustainable growth. Policies should therefore be targeted to solve two main problems. 
First, while international experience shows that successful countries incorporate as much as 40 
percent in value added, Uruguay incorporates only 27 percent in value added. Second, although 
modern production needs technological development, Uruguay is still producing unsophisticated 
products, most of which are considered commodities.  
 
  163.2.2  Characteristics of Directives of Industrial Policy 
 
Current plans for Uruguayan industrial policy focus on all technologically based industrial 
sectors, including the energy sector. Uruguay’s Industrial Strategy defines eligible industries as 
follows:  
 
1.  Successful industries capable of introducing technology and value added: 
meat, dairy, leather, rice, wood, pulp and paper, mining, fisheries. 
2.  Skilled labor-intensive industries: software, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, 
textile processes, construction, energy, shipbuilding. 
3.  New industries: chemicals, plastics, agricultural equipment, non-mineral 
materials, renewable energy, biotechnology. 
4.  Support services: software, engineering, logistics, transport, communications. 
 
  Each of these industries is eligible for protection and promotion either through public 
inputs and/or market oriented incentives (see below). 
      Since the proposal above defines “Strategic Industries,” it would be tempting to think in 
terms of vertical productive development policies. However, as described in the previous 
paragraph, the scope of industries included as strategic is so wide that in practice practically 
includes all relevant industrial sectors.  In other words, although some clusters have been and 
will be selected (see below), no industry is excluded ex ante. We will therefore consider the 
proposal as horizontal, and the unit of reference will be a productive cluster or value chain. 
Government will concentrate on the active promotion of industrial sectors that are 
technology-based and regionally integrated. Promotion includes support for financially weak 
corporations. Nonetheless, Government will not necessarily participate in the production of 
goods and services, which is left mainly to the private sector. 
Consistently with the analysis developed by the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of 
Industry has agreed that the main restriction on Uruguayan economic and social development is 
the lack of relevant productive investment. Uruguayan restrictions do not stem from the quality 
of its labor force, nor from participation rates, but from the lack of capital investment.  
One difference between the strategy supported by the Secretary of Finance and the 
Secretary of Energy is that the former is a pure horizontal strategy while the latter considers 
cluster formation an important element. This industrial strategy is based not only on the 
  17development of new products, but also on the development of new production processes taking 
advantage of globalization (outsourcing) and clusterization, with goals including the 
achievement of economies of scale in a section of the value chain.  
The strategy presents the measures described below as an optimal regional integration 
policy. First, there is the need to study recent global trends in each industry and industrial 
process. Second, a comparison of cost structures and competitive abilities between international 
and Uruguayan competitors will define the gap to be eliminated. Third, the gap will be addressed 
by concrete measures using appropriate incentives 
According to the directives, incentives will necessarily be temporary so as to avoid 
permanent support of inefficient production. Public support, moreover, will not discriminate 
between domestic and foreign investors: the government views long-term investment as naturally 
good regardless of who the residual claimant may be. Incentives will not be general but problem-
specific, that is, targeted to solving particular and well-identified problems, subject to control and 
evaluation. According to the directives, incentives need to be transparent, subject to counter 
duties and socially negotiated (i.e., by relevant, interested parties).  
The directives set forth several goals: i) economic growth, ii) incorporation of value 
added, iii) technological development, and iv) promotion of environmentally friendly projects. 
More specific objectives are the following:  
 
1.  Annual industrial production growth of 10 percent for the period 2008-2015. 
2.  A threefold increase in production meeting international technological 
standards by 2015. 
3.  Increasing renewable-based energy production (not including hydroelectric) to 
at least 15 percent of total domestic consumption by 2015. 
 
3.2.3  Market and Public Failures   
According to Government officials, Uruguayan industrial development faces several restrictions 
of diverse nature and significance.  The most relevant restrictions include the following:  
 
1.  Uruguay lacks an adequate supply of skilled workers. The Directives 
therefore create an institutional body, the Productive Cabinet, which will 
create and coordinate specific human capital formation programs with 
  18other relevant public institutions.
12 The ultimate goal is to check market 
conditions periodically and to adapt current programs to changes in those 
market conditions.  
2.  While industrial development requires low-cost and efficient energy 
resources, Uruguay faces notable natural resources restrictions. New 
sources of energy such as solar, wind and others still face information 
problems and credit restrictions, which require the participation of the 
public sector. 
3.  There is a shortage of physical and administrative infrastructure. This 
coordination failure requires large investments, some of which need to be 
financed and probably carried out by the public sector.  
4.  Both quality and quantity of information needs to be improved. In 
particular, rules on project selection, monitoring, credit conditions and 
other requirements must be made available to investors. Progress has been 
made through the implementation of legislation including the Industrial 
Promotion Bill, the soon to be approved Bankruptcy Bill, and the 
Consumer Protection Bill.  
5.  Long-term investment requires specialized inputs in terms of human 
capital. Such investment additionally requires informed analysis of current 
and future market conditions, which extends beyond firm-specific 
research. The directives call for the creation of an institutional framework 
to improve interaction among the Productive Cabinet, the Agency for 
Development and the ANII. Long-term research is thus seen as a public 
good that needs to be publicly supplied in order to avoid innovation 
restrictions. 
6.  New strategies of industrial development include as an important 
component the participation of and cooperation between the public and 
private sectors. Government representatives are currently discussing what 
institutional structure is best suited for industrial development, and their 
                                                           
12 Such as the ANII analyzed in last subsection. 
  19main concerns involve the potential capture of public officials by private 
interests, leading to inefficient results 
7.  Long-term investments also require protection, as innovation in new 
technologies is risky because of the uncertainty of future profits (see 
analysis of Innovation Policy below).  
8.  Finally, economies of scale are an impediment for regional and 
international integration. Uruguayan firms should have the opportunity to 
integrate into global value chains through the formation of productive 
clusters so as to avoid this coordination failure. 
 
According to representatives of the Secretary of Finance, the strategy is tailored to attack 
two market failures: information problems and coordination failures that prevent an increase in 
productive investment. In this sense, the program does not try to identify each particular market 
failure associated with a particular market but instead addresses the key factor associated with 
low investment. It is argued that a boost in productive investment is a necessary condition for 
long-term development.  
 
3.2.4  Instruments of Industrial Policy 
The government has defined several instruments to achieve the objectives described in previous 
sections. The following table outlines the main development policies. 
 
Table 2. Principal Industrial Development Policies 
  Horizontal/Vertical PDPs 
Public Inputs  •  Institute for Commercial Promotion including an Export 
Promotion Fund (Agency for Industrial Development) 
•  Cluster formation (PACCPYMES AND PACC) 
•  Productive Cabinet and other Public Institutions 
•  Support (unspecified) to industries where risks are high and/or no 
FDI exists 
•  Possible promotion of a participatory institutional framework to 
achieve consensus on policy 
Market Oriented  •  Tariff exemptions for selected industrial inputs 
•  Promotion of domestic production of selected inputs trough 
selective protection 
•  Production Subsidies for selected sectors 
•  Tax exemptions for selected sectors 
  203.2.5  Evaluation 
Many of the PDPs outlined in the previous section are included as part of the Industrial 
Promotion Bill passed in 2007 and are analyzed in a separate section of this document. Here we 
concentrate on some aspects of the Bill relative to industrial promotion and on two issues: the 
institutional context and cluster formation.   
  Relative to horizontal market incentives, the directives point to the Promotion Bill of 
2007, wherein market measures such as tax benefits and production subsidies are included 
among the instruments to be used to achieve industrial development. Since the granting and 
maintenance of benefits depend on pre-established and agreed indicators (instead of the 
presentation of a business plan), it is interesting to summarize a preliminary assessment of the 
consistency of the relation between failures, instruments and potential biases. 
The main objective is to promote investment in physical and human capital, which is 
considered as the main economic restriction to economic development. A secondary and implicit 
objective is to minimize specific market and public failures of specific markets. This is not to say 
that efficiency issues are ignored, however, since officials admit the existence of pervasive 
failures such as corruption, rent seeking and market information and coordination problems. 
Our main concern is related to dynamic efficiency issues, that is, the biases that the 
incentives systems can potentially create. Since the system works on the basis of a flexible set of 
indicators, the process of selection and change of those indicators becomes relevant. The system 
is flexible in that indicators can be changed according to policy decisions. For example, if 
decentralization becomes important, an indicator that promotes investment in certain regions of 
the country could be incorporated. The weight (which measures the relative importance assigned 
to the indicator) can also be changed according to policy.  
Officials admit that this is a potential problem in terms of efficiency, but they argue that 
the system is somewhat more isolated from rent-seeking activities and corruption. In terms of 
dynamic inefficiency, officials argue that the indicators are permanently monitored to correct for 
possible biases in policy. 
 
  213.2.6  Institutional Context 
The relevance of the institutional context within which development policies are executed has 
gained momentum in recent years, especially after the successful development experience of 
small open economies such as Taiwan, South Korea, New Zealand and Ireland.   
According to officials of the Ministry of Finance who instrumented the modifications to 
the Industrial Promotion Bill, three cases were considered potential benchmarks to be applied to 
Uruguay: China, Germany and Ireland. Permanent participatory institutions were nonetheless 
discarded as valid instruments for promoting industrial development in Uruguay because of fears 
of capture by special interests. The view held by officials at the Ministry of Industry is somewhat 
different, and they have proposed the institutional structure shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Proposed Institutional Structure 
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The Production Cabinet will include representatives of different public offices such as the 
Office of Coordination and Planning, the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Agriculture, Cattle 
and Fisheries and the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining. The Cabinet will exercise 
leadership in regard to sectors selected for promotion, and the Agency for Industrial 
Development will plan, execute and control the industrial strategy. Not included in the diagram 
above is the National Advisory Council for Industrial Development, made up of the “most 
relevant social actors for industrial development,” which remain unspecified. The Sectoral 
Councils will include representatives of the public and private sectors, including both 
management and labor, with the principal purpose of exchanging information and advice. The 
  22Coordination Councils will work with other public agencies on issues such as commercial 
Policy, Research and Development and Human Resources. 
According to public officials at the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining, this 
institutional setting is under evaluation and being negotiated with other Secretaries and the 
President. However, according to one official the setting described above will be modified. This 
official further specified that the benchmark for this setting was analogous structures in Brazil 
and South East Asia.  
At this point we can reasonably conclude that the Sectoral and Coordination Councils 
will not be a part of the framework. Policy will be defined by the Production Cabinet and 
implemented by the Agency for Industrial Development. Private sector participation will take 
place as necessary but will not be institutionalized as a permanent body. This view parallels that 
of the Ministry of Finance, where the fear of capture by special interests is predominant. 
 
3.2.7  Cluster Formation 
 
There are two main cluster programs in Uruguay: PACCPYMES,
13 a Program undertaken by the 
Secretary of Industry and PACC,
14 undertaken by the Office of Planning and Budget. 
PACCPYMES consists of three main subprograms: a) Clusters (PC), b) Firms (PF), and 
c) Networks (PN). We are interested in the first of these programs. 
The PC Program targets interested private companies so that they may cooperate with 
each other and with public officials to improve the competitiveness of each firm through a joint 
venture, or cluster. The process of cluster formation includes several stages: i) selection and 
briefing of interested parties, ii) collection and evaluation of relevant information, iii) diagnosis 
and strategic planning, and iv) execution. Selected firms will obtain the following benefits: i) a 
coordinator/facilitator, ii) support in logistics and dissemination of experience, iii) expert support 
for strategic planning, and iv) a subsidy of up to 100,000 Euros to co-finance the entire process. 
Clusters are evaluated and selected according to their potential for the development of 
non-primary products. An important prerequisite is the existence of a critical mass of firms 
capable of working in association with other firms. Firms must be willing to risk their own 
resources and able to prepare a feasible action plan, or strategy.  
                                                           
13 Programa de Apoyo a la Competitividad y Promoción de Exportaciones de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa 
Secretary of Industry, Energy and Mining. 
14 Programa de Competitividad y Conglomerados de Cadenas Productivas, Office of Budget and Planning.  
  23After a critical mass of firms is detected, representatives of would-be clusters are asked to 
present their projects. Several factors are evaluated at this stage: firm’s commitment to 
objectives, contribution to the goals of the PC Program, and internal consistency. This stage ends 
with the selection of 10 proposals. An Evaluation Committee then evaluates the institutional 
capacity, the level of social cohesion between the partners and the long-term profitability of the 
project. This stage ends with the selection of the best five proposals 
Finally, the selected proposals’ potential for replication is evaluated. There are several 
clusters and value chains currently in formation. The Secretary of Energy is working on seven 
Clusters,
15 and the Office of Budget and Planning is also working on several projects.
16  
 
3.2.8  Market Failures Related to Clusters 
 
This program attempts to minimize major restrictions on the development of a sustainable 
network of small firms. First, while scale economies limit the development of these firms, scale 
economies can be obtained if firms associate in joint production. Second, coordination failures 
between small and larger firms can be minimized through the formation of clusters. Information 
asymmetries can also be minimized through means such as credit negotiations with financial 
institutions. Last but not least, small firms are labor-intensive and can contribute to relaxing the 
restriction of high unemployment and its attendant social costs.  
 
3.2.9  Summary 
 
Industrial Directives, a new initiative of the Vázquez Administration, attempts to develop 
targeted industrial sectors and solve market and public failures by using market incentives, 
supplying public goods and creating an institutional environment where policy is formulated on a 
consensual basis. As the proposed institutional context is still largely under discussion by 
officials, it is too soon to evaluate the initiative’s success.  
  
                                                           
15 Wine, Tourism (2), Life Sciences, Cheese, Logistics and Transportation, Naval Industry, and an Agricultural 
project on the western coast of Uruguay). 
16 Beekeeping, Blueberries, Shoes, Software, Tourism, Clothing.  
  243.3  Investment Promotion 
 
3.3.1  Introduction 
 
State intervention to promote industrial development was justified on the basis of “Open 
Regionalism,” and a Bill on Industrial Promotion was passed to take advantage of the potential 
attractiveness of MERCOSUR in 1998. The bill had two fundamental objectives. First, it aimed 
to improve investment conditions through market-oriented policies such as tax incentives. 
Second, the regulatory framework was modified to assure non-discrimination against foreign 
investors, private property guarantees and the permanence of tax treatment. There was also an 
attempt to increase transparency and reduce bureaucratic costs. 
The current administration concluded that some unintended consequences of the Bill 
needed to be evaluated. These include bureaucratic delays, lack of transparency in the selection 
of investment projects, discrimination against small investment projects,
17 biases towards 
selecting investments in physical assets, insufficient tax-exemption periods, and limitations on 
tax benefits to projects financed by retained earnings or capital investment (Canalización del 
Ahorro). 
 
3.3.2  New Framework 
 
In 2007, the Vázquez Administration passed Presidential Decree 455/07,
18 which introduced 
modifications aimed at correcting the deficiencies mentioned above. It also passed new criteria 
for investment evaluation and selection to be used by the Application Commission (Comisión de 
Aplicación, COMAP). These criteria represented a change in the attitude towards investment and 
a new “shock” strategy to attract investment. The main objectives of the new framework are the 
same that were stated in 1998 law: 
 
1.  To improve competitiveness through technical progress; 
2.  To facilitate development of more and new exports, especially those that 
incorporate local value added; 
3.  To generate productive employment; 
                                                           
17 Free Zones attracted foreign and primarily large-scale investments, while the Bill was used by large and mid-size 
investors, leaving benefits inaccessible to small projects. The costs associated with the presentation of the promotion 
were prohibitive for small firms, and businesses other than corporations (Sociedades Anónimas) were effectively 
discriminated against.   
  254.  To facilitate the formation of productive chains, or value chains 
5.  To facilitate the creation of new small and medium size companies 
6.  To facilitate economic (industrial, agricultural, services) and social 
decentralization, as a means to achieve sustainable development.  
 
The investment promotion system consists of an executive committee (“Comisión de 
Aplicación”, COMAP) made up of delegates from the Ministry of Economics and Finance 
(coordinator), the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Labor, the 
Ministry of Tourism and the Budget and Planning Office. This commission recommends the 
promotion of projects to the executive branch in a rather automatic way after ensuring that all 
requirements have been met, and selected projects are granted tax benefits.  
Also involved is new office at the Ministry of Finance: the Private Sector Development 
and Investment Support Unit (“Unidad de Apoyo al Desarrollo y la Inversión en el Sector 
Privado”). This unit works as a front desk in project presentations and facilitates firms’ 
relationships with the public sector. 
 
3.3.3  Main Characteristics 
 
Projects are evaluated according to investors’ commitment to the objectives to be achieved rather 
than exclusively on a proposed investment project and the history of the investor(s). Paperwork 
is kept to a minimum and has to be presented only at a one-stop window. There is a 60-day 
period to decide on the project, but a tacit approval follows if no explicit declaration is made 
after 60 days.  
As shown in Table 3, investment projects are classified according to amount to be 
invested and to their contribution to Gross Domestic Product.
19  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
18 The administration essentially maintained the goals of the original Investment Bill but changed norms that relate 
to its implementation. 
19 One of the objectives is to facilitate presentation of projects by small companies 
  26Table 3. Classification of Investment Size 
 
  Amount of investment
20    Investment as percentage 
of 2008 GDP
21
Small  Less than 0.3  Less than 0.001 
Mid-size 1  0.3 to 1.2  0.001 to 0.004 
Mid-size 2  1.2 to 6.0  0.004 to 0.020 
Large 1  6.0 to 12.0  0.020 to 0.040 
Large 2  12.0 to 42.0  0.040 to 0.145 
Large 3  42.0 to 600.0  0.145 to 2.00% 
Of Great Economic 
Significance 
More than 600.0  More than 2.00% 
 
 
In addition, as shown in Table 4, incentives
22 and achievement of objectives are 
specifically linked through a Matrix of Indicators.
23    
 
Table 4. Criteria for Classification 
 
Indicator Criteria 
Employment Jobs  (Full  time equivalent) created  
Geographic Decentralization towards 
poorer regions 
Local Human Development Index  
New Exports  Relative to no-project situation 
Domestic Value Added  Change in the participation of local salaries 
and inputs in sales 
Clean Technologies  % of “Clean Investment” on total 
investment 
R&D and Innovation  % of R&D on total investment or number 
of R&D jobs created  
Impact on GDP  For each 0.003% of GDP of investment 
Labor Agreement  Collective Agreement approved by Govt. 
 
 
The period over which tax benefits (rent) are granted ranges from a minimum of three to 
a maximum of 20 years. Moreover, benefits can be used at a decreasing rate: the maximum 90 
percent income tax (IRAE) exemption can be used during the first half of the period, with 
gradual reduction in second half. 
                                                           
20 US$ million in September 2008.   
21 2008 GDP is estimated at US$30 billion.  
22 Benefits include the amount of the exemption and the period of exemption.  
  27The term “Industry” means not only manufacturing, but also services and commerce. In 
other words, benefits can apply not only to investments in traditional industrial sectors but also to 
new sectors such as software, logistics, and transportation. Additionally, benefits can apply to 
investments in fixed assets and “intangibles” as well as equipment. 
Those benefits are strongly concentrated in giving a robust signal to investors by 
increasing their rents: the average fiscal incentive was established three times the monetary 
amount of the old regime. Benefits are also strongly associated with the successful achievement 
of agreed objectives (measured by the indicators shown above). Moreover, benefits are protected 
against domestic inflation, as they are expressed in terms of Indexed Units, which means that 
benefits will be increased according to the rate of domestic inflation, 
Benefits can be easily modified if new investments are made or if objectives are 
surpassed. The intention is to provide flexibility to adapt cost structures to an uncertain 
environment, rewarding “self-discovery” by automatically updating incentives to the more 
productive reality.  
 
3.3.4  Market and Public Failures 
Although the government focused on the broad goal of increasing investment without directly 
addressing specific market failures, Table 5, based on informal discussions with officials, 
attempts to link proposed indicators to relevant failures.  
 
Table 5. Objectives and Restrictions 
Objectives of Fiscal Incentive  Restrictions to be Minimized 
Increase of Employment  Lack of spillover of tax exemptions 
Lack of skilled labor 
Exports increase (US$)  Scale economies 
Market size 




Increase of Value Added  Lack of skilled labor 
Availability of Natural Resources 
Appropriability of Self-discovery 
Environment-friendly investments  Negative externalities 
R&D  Underdeveloped Academic Research  
Asymmetric information 
Modern Labor Relations  Asymmetric Information 
Principal-Agent problem 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
23 Small projects are allowed to choose only one and unique indicator which will determine the extent of the benefit 
received. 
  28The new investment framework is tailored to minimize two relevant public failures,   
corruption and rent seeking, and does so by setting a up framework that applies across the board 
and includes clear and quantitative measures of evaluation. To receive benefits, investors need to 
meet different predetermined objectives during the life of the project. These pre-determined 
objectives are set by policy, and each objective is weighted by policy as well—a framework that 
may lead to granting excessive benefits relative to efficiency and/or to distortions in the 
allocation of resources (bad selection of indicators). Officials acknowledge this potential 
problem but contend that the system is flexible enough to be changed whenever distortions and 
/or errors are detected. Since the priority is given to increasing investment, officials believe this 
framework to be the best mechanism. 
 
3.3.5  Summary  
Investment promotion provides the PDP scheme with a powerful horizontal tool. Its main 
features are that it is general, transparent and designed to provide coverage. The new framework 
substantially increased tax benefits, relegating cost-efficacy issues to a secondary priority. At this 
stage policy was designed to produce a positive shock in expectations, attract investment and 
even put Uruguay on international listings of the best places to invest. Potential problems with 
this framework nonetheless include the following: i) selection of appropriate indicators, ii) their 
calibration, and iii) potential unintended biases. Indicators and parameters need to be constantly 
revised in order to adequately represent changing circumstances.  
 
4  Vertical Policies 
 
4.1  Sustainable Production Project
24 in the Agricultural Sector) 
 
4.1.1  Motivation: Explosive Growth in Soybean Production 
 
Probably the most important structural change of the last decade in the Uruguayan agriculture is 
the development of the soybean sector. While the Sustainable Production Project is not the 
official response to the challenges posed by the soy sector as such, understanding the issues 
raised by the sector’s explosive development are useful in explaining the working of the 
Sustainable Production Project.  
                                                           
24 In Spanish: “Proyecto de Producción Responsable”.  
  29At the beginning of the century soy was almost entirely absent from Uruguayan 
agriculture, but since 2000 that crop has grown enormously both in absolute value (tons and 
monetary value) and as a share of total agricultural production. By 2006, soy production 
accounted for 17 percent of total agricultural production, and by 2007 soy exports totaled more 
than US$200 million, representing one third of agricultural exports. These increases resulted 
from rising prices as well as larger harvests.   Soy prices rose from $164 per ton to $288 per ton 
(a price increase of 75 percent in seven years). The area planted with soy also increased in 
absolute and relative terms. By 2007 the area devoted to soy production was the largest of all 
agricultural products, even above rice.  
Almost all of the soy produced in Uruguay is transgenic. Using genetic engineering 
techniques it is possible to alter the genetic material of living organisms, producing what are 
called genetically modified organisms (GMO). These techniques allow the combination of DNA 
molecules from different sources into one molecule to create a new set of genes. This DNA is 
then transferred into an organism that acquires enhanced or novel traits. In 1995, Monsanto, an 
international corporation, introduced Roundup Ready (RR) soybeans. These RR soybeans have 
had a copy of a gene from the bacterium Agrobacterium sp strain CP4 inserted into its genome, 
which allows the transgenic plant to survive being sprayed by the non-selective herbicide 
Roundup (the active ingredient of which is glyphosate). This allows farmers to reduce tillage or 
even sow the seed directly into an unplowed field. 
4.1.2  Market Failures 
 
On the basis of the related academic literature, the public press and informal discussions with 
relevant parties, it is apparent that several market failures exist in soy development; such market 
failures may also exist in regard to other agricultural product.  It is important to note, however, 
that there is no consensus on the severity of these market failures, and the range of opinions is 
quite wide. For instance, a consulting firm (SERAGRO) argued in the press that a temporal ban 
imposed by the government on the introduction of new GMO (January 2007) was a terrible 
policy mistake in contradiction with the innovation policies fostered by the government. The ban 
would delay the development of the agricultural sector and, since increasing soybean production 
has a positive impact on livestock (cattle) production, the ban would negatively affect the latter  
sector as well. On the other extreme, in a recently published book by RAP-AL
25 (Blum et al., 
                                                           
25 RAP-AL Uruguay is a member of PAN International (Pesticide Action Network). 
  302008) it is mentioned that most transgenic soy producers in Uruguay are foreigners renting land 
at low prices without concern for soil and the environment. According to the authors, these firms 
make profits in the short run, but Uruguay faces long-run impacts of soil erosion, water pollution 
and health effects for the industry’s workers.
26  
Given the great distance between the views of SERAGRO and RAP-AL, among other 
actors, any discussion of possible market failures and policies to solve them should be 
undertaken with care. While some actors in the industry view market failures as minimal (if they 
in fact exist) and have no real impact, others argue that those failures are significant and that the 
government has been negligent in addressing them, to the extent that increasing soy cultivation 
works against the country’s development.  The discussion here is confined to the economic 
rationale of the most important potential market failures and how the Sustainable Production 
Project is supposed to deal with them. We do not estimate the severity of any market failures, nor 
do we assess whether the policies implemented had the desired impact.   
The most important market failure mentioned by several actors and members of the 
government is the negative externality of transgenic soy in the environment. Particularly cited 
were soil erosion, water pollution and potential impacts on animal and plant biodiversity.  
Others have further argued also that transgenic soy has negative externalities to other 
sectors. Gudynas (2007) notes that cattle producers are concerned about the proliferation of 
transgenic soy because of the risk it represents to meat labeled “organic,” which is supposed to 
come from cattle that are not raised in transgenic fields or given transgenic feed. Palomeque 
(2008) mentions that many honey producers have complained about the decrease in the number 
of bees in areas surrounding transgenic soy fields. To the best of our knowledge, however, no 
public institution has taken action to establish the validity of these complaints. 
A third market problem has to do with innovation. Although RR soybeans have been 
patented by Monsanto, there is a need for research on how to adapt them to the weather and soil 
                                                           
26 In their words (in Spanish):“Gran parte de los cultivadores de soja transgénica en nuestro país son “empresarios 
extranjeros” que arriendan las tierras a un bajo precio y el cuidado de la tierra es lo que menos les importa. El 
beneficio económico que obtienen estas empresas es logrado en un período muy corto (seis meses), pero al país le 
cuesta muy caro, ya que una vez hecha la cosecha el suelo queda degradado y sin cobertura vegetal.  
Es decir, que a Uruguay solo le queda el destrozo y la erosión de la tierra, contaminación del agua y efectos en la 
salud de los trabajadores y pobladores locales. Este tipo de monocultivos destructivos se consolida y profundiza 
año a año y la perdida de nuestras tierras agrícolas se intensifica, lo que implica una agudización de la pérdida de 
soberanía nacional y alimentaria del país”. 
  31characteristics of Uruguay. The market failure here is a result of the incomplete appropriability 
of this research.
27 
Finally, the growth of the soy sector and its strong export orientation demands 
infrastructure to transport produce, store it in appropriate conditions and finally ship it to its 
destination. Lack of such infrastructure may have created coordination problems that could have 
jeopardized the development of the soy sector.
28 
 
4.1.3  Sustainable Production Project 
 
The Sustainable Production Project is being carried out under the Secretary of Agriculture. The 
main goal of the project is to foster the adoption of efficient systems of production based on 
natural resources (including biodiversity) that are both economically and environmentally 
sustainable.
29  As this is a very broad objective, it is important to understand the diagnostic of the 
agricultural sector that this project is trying to address.  
According to the Operation Manual of the Project, the main problems detected are the 
following: 
1.  Problems of soil erosion, difficulties in the implementation of conservation 
practices and problems with the change from traditional tillage to no-till 
farming.
30 
2.  Inefficiencies in the use of watering due to lack of equipment.  
3.  Degradation  of  pastures and genetic resources (especially those on 
pasturelands) due to overgrazing or improper grazing and to the lack of 
national-level consensus on the concept of “environmental services.”   
                                                           
27 This is not a goal of the Sustainable Production Project. The National Seed Institute (INASE, Instituto Nacional 
de Semillas) is devoted to promoting and contributing to the development of seed-related activities by furthering use 
and production of superior-quality seed. The goal of the National Institute of Agricultural Research (INIA, Instituto 
Nacional de Investigación Agropecuaria) is to contribute to the development of the agricultural sector by generating, 
incorporating and adapting knowledge and technology. The Mesa Tecnológica de Oleaginosos was created in 
December 2005 following the initiative of several public actors and 11 private firms. The goal of the consortium is 
to create a framework to analyze the competitiveness of the sector. One of its specific objectives is to co-finance 
projects of mutual interest. In this sense a public good can be transformed into a club good (as analyzed in the 
innovation section of this paper), and the free riding effect vanishes or at least is significantly reduced. 
28 This is also not a specific concern of the Sustainable Production Project. The Plan Nacional de Silos and the 
Secretary of Infrastructure and Public Works are more related to this issue.  
29 In Spanish “promover la adopción de sistemas de manejo integrado y eficiente de los recursos naturales de uso 
agropecuario, incluyendo a la diversidad biológica, que sean económica y ambientalmente viables”. 
30 No-till farming is a technique where the producer sows the seed directly into an unplowed field. It is traditionally 
associated with less soil erosion and lower impact in wildlife habitat.  
  324.  Lack of a modern system of information and monitoring of natural resources 
that could help to manage climatic risk such as drought. 
5.  Lack of identification of elements of biodiversity with productive potential.  
6.  Lack of a comprehensive national understanding that could perpetuate the 
genetic and natural biodiversity.  
7.  Problems in water provision not only in quantitative terms but also in 
qualitative terms due to pollution.   
8.  Excessive and inadequate use of herbicides. 
9.  Problems due to inadequate post-harvest activities including agricultural 
waste.  
10. Pests such as parrots (Myiopsitta monachus), wild pigs or boars (Sus scrofa) 
and other species 
 
4.1.4  Projects 
As of June 2008, the Sustainable Production Project had approved 2,838 projects, subsidizing an 
average of 70 percent of total investment. The subsidies were approved in four categories of 
projects according to Table 6. 
 
              Table 6. Overview of Sustainable Production Project Subsidies 
  2006 2007 2008 Total 
Natural resources management  328  657  1,261  2,246 
Biodiversity 3  26  76  705 
Drought  prevention    208 271 479 
Fishery    6 2 8 
Total 331  897  1,610  2,838 
 
4.1.5  The Economic Rationale for the Project’s Goals 
 
The Sustainable Production Project served as a direct subsidy to producers to implement 
processes addressing the problems noted above. The subsidies range from 80 percent of total 
investment for small producers to 20 percent for large producers. The emphasis on small and 
medium producers has been very strong in the implementation of the program. Even to the extent 
that in an interview with the head of the program, Alfredo Bruno, he remarked that the main 
  33point of the program is to help (subsidize) small agricultural producers while production 
improvements were of secondary importance. Somewhat at odds with the official statement of 
purpose, the project seems to have acted more as a tool for social policy than as a PDP.  
We understand how water pollution and vegetal biodiversity can be subject to 
externalities, and in the spirit of the Coase Theorem spirit there is an impact on them because 
property rights are not well defined. But from an economist’s point of view it is more difficult to 
understand the impact on soil erosion and why this impact on soil erosion (if there is any) is 
above the social optimum level. Land is privately owned and the owner of the land should care 
about the net present value of the income from this land. If he decides to produce soy without 
alternating with other products or even without alternating soy and cattle production (as is more 
traditional in Uruguay), it must be that he believes this is his best course of action. It has been 
argued that “foreign” entrepreneurs rent lands and they do not care about soil erosion, only short- 
run profits. But this also does not make sense. If the owner of the land decides to rent the field he 
should know what he is doing. Likewise, we do not have regulations to control the renting of 
apartments in the summer at seaside resorts. It is natural that house renters care about the 
building less than owners, but if the owner chooses to rent it to an Argentinean tourist it is 
because that is what is best for him. With property rights well defined the market provides the 
social optimum level of soil erosion.  
The fact that the soil is a non-renewable production factor does not affect the argument 
that under well-defined property rights the market produces the social optimal outcome. But, if 
this social optimal outcome is attained by a process of trial and error, the impact of mistakes on 
soil is much worse than in the case of renewable factors of production.   
Therefore in order to argue that there is a need for government intervention to control soil 
erosion we need to argue that i) land is not really private property, ii) land owners are myopic, or 
iii) there are information asymmetries. We have not found any of these arguments in official 
statements, but during an interview the head of the Sustainable Production Project mentioned 
that the current administration views soil as a “social good,” clearly implying some limits to 
private property rights to land. Nonetheless, soil regulation is not a new concern, but rather is 
one of the first environment concerns addressed by Uruguayan governments. In fact, a decree-
bill of 1981 (during the military dictatorship) states that the government has the duty to prevent 
and control soil erosion, though the details of implementation of this bill were only put into 
  34practice by a Decree in 2004. Concerns about explosive soy growth motivated a new decree in 
August 2008 with more details on the type of actions in agricultural production that were 
considered inappropriate. The latter explicitly included among exploits justifications growth of 
agricultural products that do not protect the soil such as the “explosive expansion of soy.” A new 
soil protection bill is under discussion.   
 
4.1.6  Summary  
 
The Sustainable Production Project goals refer fundamentally refers to natural resource 
management (especially soil and water) and bio-diversity. It is clear that water pollution and bio-
diversity are subject to market failures but it is much less clear how reasonable are the 
regulations on soil use. Besides this, the Sustainable Production Project has been very active in 
the last years. Finally, its focus on small establishments has more to do with social policies rather 
than productive development policies.  
 
 
4.2  Meat Traceability 
 
4.2.1  Motivation: Human Health and Product Differentiation  
 
Particularly since the appearance in England in the mid-1980s of Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as Mad Cow Disease  (MCD), the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and other institutional institutions have been concerned with the 
sanitary conditions of food products and their effect on human health. Attempts are being made 
to enhance safety conditions through the establishment of efficient traceability systems 
The increase in fresh food choice is affecting consumer demand for more and more 
product information. The identification of the origin of feed and food ingredients and food 
sources is of prime importance for the protection of consumers, particularly when products are 
found to be faulty. Many producers and public officials believe that an efficient traceability 
system would enhance safety conditions while allowing them to differentiate their products and 
obtain economic rents. Traceability should facilitate the withdrawal of foods (if needed) and 
should enable consumers to be provided with accurate information concerning safety 
characteristics and management technologies of implicated products. In addition to the increase 
  35in consumer demand, market opportunities and regulators
31 are demanding that traceability of 
meat and fresh produce be addressed as quickly as possible.   
Traceability of cattle provides numerous benefits including access to restricted markets 
(such as the European Union), improved pre-slaughter management, quick and accurate tracking 
of disease, and improved firm management and production decisions through more detailed 
information (e.g., inventory management and logistics).  
In food processing, traceability refers to the recording of all movements of the product 
and of the steps within a given production process. In situations where an efficient traceability 
system is in place, it is possible to precisely identify the product’s origin and how and when it 
was produced.  In the case of meat products, traceback systems make it possible to link the final 
beef a consumer is eating at, say, a French restaurant, to the animal from which that beef was 
produced, probably bred at an Uruguayan farm and slaughtered at a U.S. processor.  Such 
traceability implies the use of data such as barcodes and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
that can be traced through the entire production flow from the farm to the processors and beyond, 
connecting all the stages of a given business.  
Traceability systems vary because different sectors (industries) face different costs and 
benefits from such systems (USDA, 2004). Hobbs (2003) states that some countries set up 
mandatory systems while other countries rely on voluntary systems. Moreover, some systems 
include tracing from the farm to the processors while others also include tracing of individual 
cuts of meat cuts up to the retail sector.  Besides food processing, traceability systems have been 
adopted in different economic industries such as logistics, materials, blood analysis and software. 
 
4.2.2  Market Failures and Traceability 
 
Insufficient traceability in food markets can arise due to information problems (asymmetries or 
absence of information) among suppliers (e.g., cattle ranchers and processors) and between 
consumers and suppliers.   
Briefly, traceability efforts to supply information on credence attributes to differentiate 
products will not be maximized if firms regard those efforts as not having value to consumers. 
On the other hand, if potential problems are not firm-specific but involve the whole industry, 
                                                           
31 For example, Harmonized EU control measures were introduced in 2001 to combat the spread of BSE. New 
elements are contained in the EU Regulation (1292/2005) which amended Annex IV of the Regulation (999/2001) 
  36firms will not have incentives to supply information on their products. In other words, if safety 
problems are common to the whole industry and out of the control of individual firms, they may 
not be willing to supply information that would expose them to liabilities. Additionally, even if 
problems are not common to the industry, firms may value anonymity if supplying information 
on products and processes exposes them to legal sanctions. Finally, traceability will be 
undersupplied when disclosure requirements are partial or incomplete and when innuendo is 
pervasive. In all these cases, government policies can be thought of as necessary.  
Alternatively, private supply of traceability information would be less than optimal due to 
the presence of externalities or the public good features of traceability. With respect to food 
safety, supply of traceability services will not be at its social optimum if the public health 
benefits of traceability are larger than the firm’s private benefits. This will happen if firms regard 
some level of anonymity as convenient, and if they cannot transfer the private cost of setting up 
traceability systems to the product price. 
 
 
4.2.3  Meat Traceability in Uruguay 
 
Uruguayan Meat Traceability system can be divided in two subsystems: a) Traceability proper 
(TP), and b) Black Boxes (BB). The former implies the tracking of data from the farm up to the 
processors, while the latter consists of tracing information on meat cuts at the industrial 
(processor) stage to the retail stage. The link between the two systems should allow for the 
tracing of beef cuts from the retail level to the farm of origin.  
The Secretary of Agriculture (MGAP) has defined the objectives of the TP as follows:  
1.  Food Safety 
2.  Create a Data Base about data on cattle characteristics and management 
practices  
3.  Certification of Production Processes 
4.  Certification of Origin 
5.  Creation of Trade Marks such as “Uruguay Natural” 
6.  Genetic Improvement 
7.  Tracking of diseases 
8.  Smuggling Control 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
from 1 September 2005. The EU is also requiring exporters to the EU to meet sanitary requirements regarding these 
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4.2.4  Traceability (TP) 
 
Animal traceability is a part of a more general system of Animal Identification
32 but goes beyond 
identification alone. The program allows the tracking of a specific animal throughout its life 
(Tracking of Products), and the tracking of how the animal was raised (Tracking of Process). 
Data collected include date and place of birth, owner, sex, breed, etc. The program also provides 
information on the route followed by the products (food) extracted from the animal, on the 
characteristics of those products, and on the middlemen involved in their trading up to delivery 
of the animal to the processors.  
Uruguay implemented the first group traceability program in 1973. Information problems 
arising at the industrial stage relative to the real weights of each animal and the corresponding 
prices paid to cattle ranchers and taxes paid to the Government showed the need for a more 
efficient information system. After the 1986 outbreak of BSE in England, Uruguay began 
implementing individual TP as a mandatory requisite to meet international standards.  
After a process of consultation with interested parties (cattle ranchers, middlemen, 
processors, and retail operators), the Government launched the TP system, which aims at the 
identification of each animal and its movements within the country. The current version of the 
program, in effect as of September 1, 2006
33 and aims at tracing every animal in the country by 
2010. As of June 2008, the Government has reached half of that goal, that is, it has traced 
5,821,585 animals, or 264,716 animals per month. Each registered interested party can access the 
available information supplied by the Government through the SNIG.  
As an indication of the interest of the different parties, the SNIG publishes the number of 
monthly visits to its web page: it has increased from an average of 5,000 in 2006 to an average of 
more than 17,000 in 2008.  
  TP and market failures. The 1973 system was created to obtain more reliable information 
on the births, deaths and movements of cattle and on the tons of meat processed and sold by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
diseases (see below) 
32 National System of Livestock Information (Sistema Nacional de Identificación Ganadera, SNIG) 
33 Initially, the system only allowed for group identification. A second stage included individual identification. 
  38processors. The main objective of the system was fiscal, that is, to control the flow of taxes paid 
by cattle ranchers and meat processors.
34  
    The TP subsystem has been created to assure food safety according to international 
standards. For a country like Uruguay, a net exporter of meat products, food safety represents not 
only a formal procedure to comply with international standards, but also a requirement to 
preserve current export markets and obtain new ones. Thus, food safety can be seen as a public 
good with environmental consequences. Public officials and representatives of cattle ranchers’ 
organizations agree on the public good nature of TP. One representative of a supplier of software 
services on traceability declared that “collecting money from producers to fund the TP program 
would be like supplying vaccines without syringes.”
35   
Accordingly, the TP system has been funded through public funds. Producers have not 
directly paid for either the hardware or the software needed to implement the system. Nor have 
they paid for its maintenance, which is carried out by the MGAP.   
Should cattle ranchers and meat processors pay for the system? Would traceability be 
socially undersupplied in this case?   We need to gauge at the private costs and benefits and the 
social costs and benefits of such a system. This case seems to fit perfectly under the “private 
benefits-social benefits” dilemma. It seems clear that safety issues are a public good and that 
there are good reasons to believe that government should fund the costs of the TP program. 
Cattle ranchers apparently do not see TP as a program that justifies the private burden of its 
costs—especially if they depend on other producers to tag their animals—although they admit 
that it is a desirable program. This gives support to the theoretical argument outlined above that 
traceability (TP) would probably be undersupplied in Uruguay.  
That said, data collected from SNIG and other sources, as well as statements by public 
officials, give cause for concern.  Figure 3 below shows the evolution of the total number of tags 
delivered to cattle ranchers from September 2006 until August 2007. The graph also shows the 
number of tags attached to the animal as well as those not attached.
36  
 
                                                           
34 Since cattle ranchers are paid by processors according to the weight of the animals delivered using scales own by 
those same processors, there are conflicts between ranchers and processors on the fair value of cattle (see the Black 
Box system)  
35 J. Barreto, Director of Proyecta Farming Services, 2006. 
36 Each producer has 60 days to attach the tag to the ear of the animal. 
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From the launching of the system to August 2007, the (monthly) average number of tags 
delivered to consumers was 268,750.   That number, however, shows a sharp decline in June and 
July of 2007, reaching less than 83,000 delivered tags per month. While the number of tags 
delivered to cattle ranchers begins to rise significantly by the end of 2007,  so does the number of 
tags that are not being attached to the animal. Moreover, the total number of tags delivered again 
declines significantly after April, 2008. If one assumes a total of 11.5 million head of cattle in 
Uruguay, to meet European Union requirements by 2010, it would have been necessary to 
deliver more than 315,000 tags to cattle ranchers each month and have more than 434,000 tags 
attached to animals each month from June 2008 to December 2009.
37  Given the rate and trend of 
compliance shown in Figure 3, it appears unlikely that these requirements have so far been met. 
If all relevant actors agree on the need for TP and the way it is being funded, then, why is 
traceability not fully implemented? Are there any other market or public failures that need to be 
addressed in order to get closer to the 2010 target? What are the potential consequences, say, in 
terms of food safety and export markets? Clearly, no Uruguayan meat will be allowed into the 
EU if there are animals left to be traced.  
One explanation for this problem is that cattle ranchers estimate the number of births and 
request tags based on that estimation. Through the press and personal contacts, we have been 
told that the number of births has been less than the number forecast. This accounts for some of 
the difference but does not provide a full explanation. 
                                                           
37 An animal is not traced until the tag is registered in MGAP. The number of traced animals by this criteria totaled 
only 3,745,861 which makes the situation even worse. 
  40Others point to the fact that the modifications to the old system of cattle registration and 
monitoring have not yet proved satisfactory: the transition from a system based on physical 
support (paper) to an electronic system has proven more difficult than expected (El País, Sunday, 
May 6, 2005, Editorial). Additionally, the new system implies the emergence of a new agent: the 
operator. Operators are individuals or firms registered at the Sistema de Información y Registro 
Animal (SIRA in Spanish).
38  Operators must have the appropriate training and infrastructure to 
supply electronic information on livestock movements and changes of property, and the operator 
is responsible for the appropriate collection and recording of the needed data. This new agent, 
moreover, needs to have basic knowledge of software and other computing technologies, which 
is a scarce factor of production in most Uruguayan rural areas.  
One important limitation is the lack of internet connections in some Uruguayan rural 
areas. This has significantly reduced the number of registered animals, according to statements 
of Juan Magallanes, director of SIRA. The extent of the coordination failure and its potential 
impact on the whole system need to be further evaluated.   
Institutional context.  As mentioned above, the TP in its current version was proposed by 
the Vázquez Administration and discussed with relevant parties such as cattle ranchers and 
associations of cattle ranchers, slaughtering and processing firms and their corresponding 
associations, transportation companies and retail operators.  
The SNIG includes the creation of the Committee for the Evaluation of the Cattle 
Information System (“Comisión de Evaluación del Sistema de Información Ganadera”), where 
representatives of the Government and the private sector discuss the evolution of the TP 
program. 
Conclusion. Regarding public safety issues, the TP policy seems to point in the right 
direction, despite all the implementation problems noted above. Public funding of TP, either 
through direct subsidies or tax rebates seems to be necessary to achieve the 2010 goals.  Potential 
coordination problems arise due to lack of appropriate internet connections in rural areas, 
especially those related to the delivery of tags, the registration of animals by cattle ranchers and 
the efficiency of the operators. 
Public funding of TP as an instrument for product differentiation is more debatable. This 
issue is treated in more detail when we discuss the second traceability subsystem, Black Boxes, 
                                                           
38 System of Animal Information and Registration  
  41but a word in advance is worthwhile here: consumers do not seem to value traceability per se as 
much as safety and quality guarantees. 
Accordingly, the policy of public funding of TP plus the strategies to assure healthy 
international standards as carried out by the current administration seem to be an adequate 
productive development policy.  
 
4.2.5  Black Boxes (BB) 
 
The initial goal of the BB project was to obtain reliable information related to taxes paid by meat 
processors.
39 The project developed into a more comprehensive electronic information system 
aimed at two main objectives: to complement the TP project at the industrial stage, and to 
increase business transparency.  
The BB project complements the TP system because it allows traceability to reach the 
individual cut of meat delivered to final consumers. BB begins by recording the data contained in 
each of the tags attached to the ear of the cattle (weight, age, origin, sex, etc.) and links this 
identification to each subsequent industrial process. The system thus allows the traceback of 
every cut of meat to the individual animal. The link of the two policies constitutes an asset to 
assure that Uruguayan meat meets quality and sanitary international standards so as to increase 
consumer confidence. In particular, this nexus guarantees the “natural” characteristics of 
Uruguayan meat, that is, there is no use of antibiotics, hormones or proteins in animals feed. 
Also, the system allows checking if cattle have been confined to yards or feedlots and if cattle 
are grass-fed. 
The Black Box system also improves business transparency.  The data contained in the 
tag are kept in every subsequent phase of the BB process, which is mainly a system of electronic 
scales located in each subsequent (seven) production stage.
40 The scales are connected to a local 
server where the weights at each stage are stored. The system also includes a set of printers and 
bar codes.  
                                                           
39 The first bid to incorporate electronic scales at processors plants took place in 1998. The Vázquez Administration 
encouraged the National Institute of Meat (INAC) to further develop the project into a more comprehensive system 
to allow for more fluid interaction between processors and ranchers. See Institutional Analysis below. 
40 The seven stages are: 1) Reception of cattle, 2) Bleeding, 3) Dressing, 4) Classification, 5) Boneless, 6) Packing, 
and 7) Delivery. The project is being implemented in two phases: Phase 1 includes Stages 1 through 4 and it is 
completed. Phase 2 includes Stages 5 through 7 and is 70 percent completed. See next footnote. 
  42All registered processors and ranchers have access to the information contained in each 
production stage. Ranchers can then link the weights at each stage to their cattle.
41 Since ranchers 
are paid according to the weight of each animal, the BB project has made a significant 
contribution by incorporating an independent weighing system. Ranchers and processors are at 
this point discussing which of the scales is the most appropriate to determine the weight that will 
be considered as the basis for payment.
42 
According to INAC President Fratti: “Each processor will have a local area network 
including a circuit of electronic scales, computers, printers, scanners and other hardware which 
cannot be hacked, that are connected through their own servers to an extended area network 
whose main server is in INAC. The data obtained from the different scales throughout the 
slaughterhouse network during the production process can be read as many times as necessary 
but cannot be modified by anyone.” 
 
BB and Market Failures. The cost of the BB project was estimated at US$ 7 million. Ranchers, 
processors and the government have agreed that US$ 1 dollar for every animal processed will be 
used to fund the project. However, this dollar will be compensated for through a tax rebate on 
current taxes. In other words, the money is coming out of fiscal revenues. Although the project is 
supported by public funds, ranchers have questioned the method, arguing that it may affect the 
prices they receive from processors.
43  
Perhaps not surprisingly, actors in the sector hold divergent views on BB. Ranchers 
regard BB as a significant improvement with respect to the information received on the weights 
paid by processors.  In turn, while processors generally support BB, some consider it a form of 
“unnecessary sophistication.” 
Those differences of opinion are clearly rooted in the system’s features and effects. First, 
the implementation of the new system minimizes the problem of asymmetric information 
between ranchers and processors.  This is consistent with explicit support by ranchers and less 
enthusiastic support by processors.  
                                                           
41 For technical information on the BB project, see: 
http://www.inac.gub.uy/innovanet/macros/Home_2_4P.jsp?contentid=1092&version=1&channelid=1 
42 Before the new system was implemented, the weights were determined by the processors using their own scales at 
the reception of the cattle. The new system incorporates a series of scales that are managed and controlled by INAC 
(see below) 
43 Note that processors are “retention agents”: they collect revenues from exports and domestic sales, from which 
they pay ranchers for their cattle and pay taxes to the government.  
  43On the other hand, the system is enthusiastically supported by the Government. BB 
represents an effective control on the industry and on the revenues collected through taxes. Since 
all information is stored and managed at INAC, the government actually has control on inputs 
and outputs processed by slaughterhouses.
44 According to some officials, BB actually acts as a 
“big brother”! This is also consistent with the positive but less than warm support by processors. 
The government additionally supports both TP and BB projects as complements to certification 
programs on meat quality and safety conditions. 
Third, some officials argue that BB represents an opportunity to develop a competitive 
advantage over other countries in the international meat market. The argument that “small is 
beautiful” applies to this case. As the BB project actually comprises almost 100 percent of all 
ranchers and processors, virtually the entire national cattle herd can be traced. This has proven to 
be an impossible task for larger countries such as Brazil and Argentina, traditional competitors. 
Thus, while product differentiation is a powerful argument for officials, ranchers and processors, 
however seem to disagree.  
Finally, there is consensus on the benefits with respect to quality assurance and safety 
issues. The benefits arise in two ways: first, BB and TP systems allow for almost immediate 
identification of the origin of a disease.
45 When BB is full in operation, a consumer will be in a 
position to identify the origin of the T-bone steak he/she is eating at a New York restaurant. If 
consumer’s health is harmed by potentially traceable meet, rancher and processors would be 
liable and subject to payments in line with the damage produced. This brings us to the second 
benefit: both ranchers and processors receive positive incentives to assure appropriate meat 
quality. Despite these positive incentives, as we have shown, the intensity of support for the 
system varies among interested parties. 
The above analysis shows that, although BB is supported in general, some actors say it is 
basically an “unnecessary sophistication.” Why does this different evaluation arise? Is 
traceability an appropriate policy to minimize information failures between ranchers and 
processors, and between them and consumers?  
                                                           
44 At INAC, we were shown how the system warns (a beep is heard) controllers every time a carcass passes through 
the different electronic scales. Information on weight, cut, origin, etc. is displayed on the monitor. Beeps sound 
every five or six seconds! 
45 In October, 2008, , a warning of potential Foot and Mouth disease (FMD) disease triggered the traceability control 
system and it took less than 10 minutes to identify the affected ranch and the cattle. It turned out to be a false 
warning.  
  44First, there is no doubt that BB has contributed to increasing transparency between 
ranchers and processors. In this respect, traceability improves efficiency and transparency and 
should be supported as such. Since BB would have been undersupplied if left to processors, the 
government has funded the system because it considers BB a public good.  
Second, does BB increase the consumer’s confidence? This is more debatable. Would 
traceability per se reduce consumer costs ex-ante, that is, before purchase? Hobbs (2003) finds 
that Canadian consumers value traceability less than other factors such as safety conditions and 
animal treatment. In other words, when choosing among different cuts of meat, consumers are 
willing to pay more for those cuts that supply objective assurance
46 of meeting international 
quality and safety standards with respect to those cuts that only assure that, in case of problems, 
the original rancher can be traced back and be subject to liability. So BB, considered just as a 
system that allows tracing the meat cut up to the rancher, does not seem to “add value” per se 
and does not seem to be an efficient policy aimed at product differentiation in international 
markets.  
The Uruguayan BB system is partially mandatory. This means that processors must 
proceed to install the necessary infrastructure in order to be able to operate the system. However, 
the actual functioning of the system is voluntary, that is, processors are not required to offer BB 
in the marketplace if not required by consumers. This is consistent with the view of BB as an 
“unnecessary sophistication,” and it is also consistent with the findings of Hobbs (2003): 
consumers do not seem to be willing to pay more for just traceability. In this sense, BB per se is 
not justified as a public good and should not be publicly funded.   
There is however, one very important reason to consider BB a public good. It creates a 
positive externality on the supply of adequate safety conditions on the part of ranchers and 
processors. This is because BB, together with TP, makes both ranchers and processors subject to 
liabilities if they are caught violating international standards. That is, the information contained 
in BB and TP allows checking if cattle is fed and managed according to international standards at 
the ranch level and if processors comply with sanitary industrial conditions. In this respect, both 
BB and TP seem to be right conceived. Moreover, one of INAC´s main activities consists on 
implementing certification programs to assure consumers the appropriate quality standards.  
                                                           
46 By International Certified and Independent Programs 
  45Institutional Context: INAC. INAC’s mission is to develop collective actions tailored to 
incorporate value added and promote the economic development of the “meat value chain” 
(cadena cárnica). 
More specifically, INAC has a special interest in regulating and monitoring 
industrialization and international trade of meat products. INAC is a public-private joint venture 
that includes the participation of private farmers (two members), private packers (two members) 
and two public officials (the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Industry, Energy and 
Mining).  
  INAC’s responsibilities include the following:  
 
1.  Provision of adequate information on market research and coordination of 
policies with other public agencies. 
2.  Authorization and registration and administration of meat exports. INAC can 
also set reference prices. 
3.  Formulation of product quality norms according to international standards. 
4.  Management of Meat Transportation Means. 
5.  Control of the retail trade. 
6.  Imposition of sanctions. 
7.  Control and management of slaughters and industrialization 
8.  Advice on technological issues 
9.  Supervision of private farmers and packers 
 
Decisions are generally made by consensus, although the President has the final vote if no 
majority is achieved. The composition of INAC includes representatives of all interested parties, 
except retail operators.  
 
4.2.6  Summary  
 
TP and BB seem to represent different things for different actors. The Government considers 
both projects as correcting for some information asymmetries between ranchers and processors, 
while at the same time acting as mechanisms of revenue control. Both projects are additionally 
seen as complementing efforts to assure adequate safety and quality conditions in international 
markets. INAC also considers BB a powerful instrument of product differentiation and regards 
the program as a public good. INAC further views BB as providing competitive advantages over 
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new products and markets.  
Ranchers are mainly concerned about their relationship with processors and the 
information problem stemming from the weighing and payment system. In this sense, they are 
strong supporters of BB. However, they do not necessarily support BB as product differentiation 
strategy, which they view as the “processors’ problem.”  On the other hand, ranchers support TP 
and the fact that it is publicly funded. They see the government as showing leadership in 
establishing a system of information for disease prevention.  
Some processors, however, consider BB an “unnecessary sophistication.” First, they see 
information asymmetries with ranchers as relatively unimportant.  Second, they think processors 
should be allowed to offer BB voluntarily to international customers, since they are not sure the 
market pays for the costs. In contrast, processors support TP as an instrument for protection 
against the spread of diseases such as FMC and BSE.  
All actors are consistently satisfied with the institutional framework represented by 
INAC. They find INAC to be providing useful services to the industry, although some think 
INAC is overstaffed. 
In our opinion, TP is justified as a mechanism to prevent the spread of disease and as a 
guarantee of product healthy conditions. In this sense, it is a public good, as BB complements TP 
in allowing the tracing of unhealthy meat if needed. The public good characteristics of BB are 
nonetheless more debatable. While both projects would allow for some product differentiation of 
Uruguayan meat in international markets, some studies show that consumers are more willing to 
pay for safety and quality than for traceability per se.  It seems that at some point BB may be 
more appropriately left to the private sector.    
 
4.3  Forestry 
 
4.3.1  Introduction 
 
One of Uruguay’s notable vertical productive development policies relates to forestry and wood 
industrialization. Promotion has been justified in terms of comparative advantages given by 
abundant natural resources and a latitude favoring the cultivation of forests,
47 As the 
characteristics of the land and climate characteristics allow trees to grow more quickly than in 
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potential investors, subsidized planting costs of plantations (but not the purchase of land), and 
provided tax exemptions. The Chilean model was used as a benchmark.   
Soil not suitable for agriculture and livestock was chosen, and production subsidies and 
tax exemptions were put in place so as to achieve competitive scales of production in forestry 
and promote diversification within small agricultural productive units. Promotion targeted two 
relatively quick-growing species, eucalyptus and pine, so as to achieve scale economies in a 
relatively short period of time. Once production of raw material in the country had achieved the 
scale needed for industrialization, it was expected that related industries such as pulp and paper, 
construction materials and furniture would locate in Uruguay. 
Figure 4 below shows the number of hectares forested per year. 
 
Figure 4.  
 
 FORESTED AREA   PER YEAR
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Source: Forestry General Agency (DGF), Secretary of Agriculture (MGAP) 
 
 
Once the production of raw material in the country achieved the scale needed for 
industrialization, related industries such as pulp mills and sawmills announced their interest in 
investing in Uruguay. Investments by large companies generally involve vertical integration, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
47 Other important factors mentioned in the interviews are a stable macroeconomic environment, a stable democratic 
regime, and education of the labor force. 
  48ensuring an adequate supply of raw materials for operation, and facilities are usually located a 
relatively small distance from forests (usually no more than approximately 300 km) to minimize 
transport costs.  
In 2002 the country entered a deep financial crisis and the government performed a fiscal 
adjustment, postponing the payment of subsidies and deciding upon the gradual reduction of new 
forestry projects. Local investors, highly indebted to the state-owned Banco República, 
attempted to sell their plantations to large international enterprises in order to eliminate their 
debts and obtain financial liquidity for their core business, livestock.  
In subsequent years pulpwood plantations began to mature and the harvest brought new 
problems of transport infrastructure like inadequate roads, lack of development of rail and 
insufficient port capacity. The installation of the first pulp mill (Botnia) on the coast of the 
Uruguay River created a conflict with neighboring Argentina. In turn, as the forested area 
increases, the risk of fire and disease becomes a more prominent policy concern.  The Vázquez 
Administration retained the strategic outline of the 1987 Bill but introduced some modifications 
related to its implementation. First, production subsidies were to be eliminated over a two-year 
period.  Second, the following new policy goals were formulated:   
 
1.  To avoid overproduction and overspecialization of pulpwood species. 
2.  To diversify production of new species and to encourage the development of 
downstream industries 
3.  To diversify geographical location of plantations, allowing new ones in the 
northeast of the country and reducing the use of areas near the agriculture and 
livestock zone and the coastal west of the country. 
4.  To develop a productive structure based on the externalities of forestry with 
livestock production (agroforest or silvopastoral system). 
5.  To encourage the participation of small producers as wood suppliers. 
 
4.3.2  Main Stakeholders 
 
Public Sector. At the policy level, the Secretary of Agriculture (MGAP) is responsible for the 
National Forestry Policy that is conducted by the Forestry General Agency (Dirección General 
Forestal, DGF). Also within the Secretary of Agriculture, the Renewable Natural Resources 
Agency (Dirección General de Recursos Naturales Renovables, DGRNR) determines which soil 
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discussion about the extension of potential forestry areas to the east of Uruguay. Additionally, if 
a forestry project involves more than 100 hectares, approval is needed by the Secretary of 
Housing and Environment.  
On research, the public Universidad de la República and the Laboratorio Tecnológico del 
Uruguay (LATU) are key players.
48  The National Institute of Agricultural Research (INIA) has 
defined six strategic areas related to forestry issues for the 2007-2011 period, and research is 
conducted in close partnership with the private sector.  The so-called “Grupo de Trabajo 
Forestal” includes representatives of private firms, farmers and other private institutions, and 
dates back to 1992. In 1995, the Government created the “Mesa Tecnológica de la Madera” with 
participation of representatives of private and public institutions. In general, private firms have 
developed their own research departments. 
  Private sector. The private sector is represented by the Union of Forestry Producers 
(Sociedad de Productores Forestales SPF) which includes independent producers, forestry 
companies, investment funds, nursery companies, service providers, and the industrial sector and 
the Union of Wood Manufacturing Industries (Cámara de Industrias Procesadoras de la Madera).  
Finally, the industry is characterized by the presence of many NGOs and lobby groups, 
mainly concerned with environmental issues and with some influence on policy.  
 
4.3.3  Diversification Policy for the Forestry Sector  
 
As mentioned above, the Vázquez Administration maintained the overall character of the 1987 
Bill but introduced several modifications designed to increase diversification.  
The following objectives were targeted for fiscal year 2008:   
 
1.  At least 25 percent of projects should be small, involving mainly family 
businesses. 
2.  At least five projects should involve the joint participation of cattle ranchers 
and/or dairy producers.  
3.  At least 100 hectares of new species (as defined by INIA) should be planted. 
                                                           
48 The School of Agronomy and the National Agriculture Research Institute (Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones 
Agropecuarias INIA), are the divisions within the public university that conduct research on forestry. 
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  The official policy objective and statements by relevant private and public actors allow 
us to characterize current forestry policy as one that aims at diversification. This diversification 
has several dimensions:  
1.  Avoiding excess supply of and dependency on eucalyptus and increasing the 
use of more productive species in the wood pulp industry that can incorporate 
more value added.  
2.   Development of downstream sectors (such as furniture) that are both more 
technologically up-to-date and labor-intensive.  
3.  Geographical diversification, allowing plantations in the east of the country 
and preventing overconcentration in the west.  
4.  Raising the number of productive units, increasing the participation of small 
producers as wood suppliers and developing a productive structure consistent 
with other traditional agricultural production such as livestock. 
5.  Avoiding conflicts with traditional agriculture (e.g., cattle and dairy). 
6.  Avoid conflicts with environmental NGOs. 
 
4.3.4  Policy Instruments  
 
The main policy instruments that have characterized forestry promotion in Uruguay have been 
the following:    
 
1.  Restricted soil selection; 
2.  Production subsidies of up to 50 percent of planting costs; 
3.  Tax exemptions on accrued rent and capital, and on imports of equipment; 
4.  Favorable credit conditions;  
5.  Tax rebates on exports; and  
6.  Public goods dedicated to research (INIA, LATU, and UDELAR). 
 
The Vázquez Administration has implemented the policy objectives described above 
through a variety of measures. Soils located in the Southern and Western regions of the country 
have been eliminated as eligible for forestry projects, and soils located in the Eastern part of the 
country have been updated as eligible for forestry projects. Final decisions on soil classification, 
however, are made by the Secretary of Agriculture. This raises issues of discretionality and rent- 
seeking activities and may have effects on land prices.   
  51In addition, forestry projects of more than 100 hectares now need to obtain environmental 
approval from the Secretary of Housing and Environment (they were previously exempt from 
that requirement), and tax exemptions discriminate in favor of “high quality” wood
49 and against 
pulpwood production with short rotation techniques. Subsidies have been eliminated, moreover, 
with that elimination made effective 2005 rather than 2007 as originally planned. The private 
sector has accepted this measure as a natural consequence of the evolution of the industry.  
Additional measures are being undertaken in regard to other aspects of the industry. While 
production subsidies to small producers are intended to diversify industrial firms’ sources of 
wood supply, so far only 14 projects have been approved, and the Vázquez Administration 
intends to generalize this instrument in order to boost supply diversification. Research and 
development remains a policy priority, as mentioned above, especially in relation to the 
development of new species suitable for high-quality wood production.  In regard to sanitary 
conditions and fire prevention, public goods with strong externalities, the Government has 
established quality standards through measures such as the implementation of a best practices 
booklet (“Código de Buenas Prácticas Forestales”).  
 
4.3.5  Market and Public Failures that Justify Diversification Policy 
 
Promotion of new soils in Eastern Regions. This policy is justified in terms preventing the spread 
of forestry to regions that are more suitable for dairy production and cattle raising, and to avoid 
concentration.  While the western region is not currently saturated, two pulp mill projects there 
(BOTNIA and ENCE) led to an international conflict with Argentina. 
The bureaucratic management of this policy entails potential problems. As forestry 
authorization in the east is granted on a case-by-case basis, there exist incentives for rent-seeking 
and corruption that may distort commercial negotiation with landowners. 
Prior environmental authorization. While this measure has been justified on the basis of 
ensuring appropriate use of water, no clear objective criteria are offered for granting or denying  
authorization. Some entrepreneurs have informed us of potential delays, especially because   
authorization is granted only after the project has been approved by the DGF, generating 
inconsistencies between bureaucratic times and productive times   
                                                           
49 Wood more than 15 years old from plantings with a density of between 100 and 450 trees per hectare. more than 
15 years, coming from plantings with density between 100 and 450 trees per hectare. Additionally, more than 20 
percent of the harvest must be used as raw materials by sawmills.  
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the negative externalities of the current mode of production, highly specialized in eucalyptus and 
pulpwood.  High-quality wood is especially appropriate in downstream industrial sectors which 
are labor intensive and present scale economies.  
The negative incentive for pulpwood production has been criticized by some investors, 
who see this policy as “too much intervention” in a very dynamic market characterized by 
uncertainty regarding future demand conditions.  
Elimination of productive subsidies. This measure has been justified by public officials 
because the objectives of financing long-term risks and obtain appropriate scales economies had 
been achieved.  
Subsidies for projects including both forestry and cattle production. Joint production has 
positive externalities because trees supply adequate shelter to cattle and cattle clear brush from 
the soil, reducing fire risk. On the other hand, since forestry threatens other productive activities 
such as cattle and dairy production, efforts towards joint production (e.g., forestry and dairy in 
the same unit) prevents rural migration to urban locations. This externality is recognized by the 
private sector, and there is an interesting development of contracts and projects of joint 
production without public sector intervention. The downside of this policy is that no clear criteria 
for the granting of subsidies have been established, leading to discretion and potential rent-
seeking. In addition, implementation is time consuming and has a high administrative cost. 
Research and Development. The goal here is to supply a public good for the development 
of new species and increase of productivity. INIA has taken the initiative in developing research 
programs. There so far seems to be a lack of appropriate interaction with the private sector, 
especially with respect to the market opportunities of new species.  
 
4.3.6  Summary 
 
Overall, the set of legal modifications established since 2005 seem to be consistent with the 
objectives of greater diversification in production, environmental protection, decentralization, 
and minimization of social conflicts. 
Weaknesses seem to arise in the lack of public resources to manage the process for 
achieving those objectives. In general, public decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, which 
is subject to rent-seeking activities, since there are no clear rules. Both private and public actors 
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other. Some interaction between private and public actors has occurred in academia and through 
research and development. Moreover, private investors and the Government have overcome their 
initial differences and fears and state they have an acceptable relationship. Some investors, 
however, worry about potential negative discrimination in light of the pulpwood experience. 
The following conclusions can be drawn:  
1.  There are elements that lead us to think of a consistency between incentives 
and objectives of public and private actors. 
2.  Participation of the private sector in the design, selection, and implementation 
of productive policies is not homogeneous.  
3.  Some public actions are seen as too much intervention, subject to public 
failures. 
4.  There is no institutionalized learning mechanism through which errors are 
corrected and policies changed based on consensus. 
5.  There are coordination problems with other industrial sectors and different 
horizontal policies, such as infrastructure policy. 
6.  Self-discovery is promoted through Research at INIA and LATU, although 
some uncertainty remains about changes in rules. 
 
5. Final Words 
 
In this paper we have reviewed and assessed some of the Productive Development Policies 
currently being implemented in Uruguay. We have selected three horizontal and three vertical 
policies, and we consider them in light of the market and public failures they attempt to address. 
We also describe and analyze the process by which those productive development policies are 
established, that is, the institutional structure that includes public and private actors and their 
interactions. Horizontal policies comprise Innovation, Industrial Promotion and Directives for 
Industrial and Technological Development. Vertical policies include the Forestry Law, Meat 
Traceability and the Sustainable Production Project in the agricultural sector. Although we found 
that in principle the policies studied could be understood as attacking market or coordination 
failures, and we did not find any obvious contradictions among them, we did find problems in 
  54their implementation and sometimes even differences in the approaches of the authorities and the 
letter of the law or regulation.  
An important generalized change is the commitment to more active policies than in past 
years. While those policies imply significant fiscal costs that were affordable in boom years, the 
fiscal sustainability of these policies over the business cycle is uncertain.  
Finally, it is generally too early to evaluate the success of the policies in terms of welfare 
improvements, an issue beyond the scope of this paper.  
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